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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of an entire campaign using a randomized field experiment
where the treatment consists of campaign decisionsmade by a campaignmanager. In con-
trast to the majority of the field experiments found in the contemporary get-out-the-vote
literature, this paper studies the actual behavior of a campaignwithin a particular election
as opposed to studying particular mobilization tactics. Thus, the campaign itself chooses
which method to contact each individual within the randomly assigned treatment group.
Contacts are made via face-to-face canvassing, phone calls, emails, and doorhangers and
consist of experienced volunteers making partisan appeals. We observe a large treatment
effect of campaign contact despite a small number of face-to-face contacts, suggesting that
the targeting strategy of the campaign manager is particularly effective.
1 Introduction
Despite the proliferation of academic studies of voter mobilization campaigns, it is un-
clear whether much of the recent research sheds light on how effective partisan voter
mobilization is in the real world of practical politics. Most of the existing academic field
experiments are conducted using non-partisan get-out-the-vote (GOTV) messages, while
most real-world campaigns are conducted using political and often highly partisan mes-
sages about candidates, issues, or ideologies (e.g. Gerber and Green 2000a). Additionally,
much of the academic research in this area has examined the efficacy of different types
of mobilization strategies — measuring the relative effectiveness of direct mail versus
phone calls versus door-to-door canvassing, for example (Gerber and Green 2004). And
finally, it is not clear that academic research has examined adequately the groups in the
registered voter population that campaigns may target for different types of mobilization
efforts, especially low or moderate propensity voters. Yet while research has been done
to analyze each type of mobilization effort, typically using non-partisan messages, little
work has been done to try to evaluate what established political campaign managers and
their respective staff do when left to their own devices to combine each of these compo-
nents, devise the partisan messages, develop a target group in the electorate, and run a
campaign.
The field experiment we report on in this paper provided us with a unique opportu-
nity to examine mobilization effects from a real world campaign, conducted exactly as a
real-world campaign manager would undertake various voter mobilization efforts. An
evaluation of a real campaign’s get-out-the-vote efforts provides insights into the kind of
turnout effects campaignmanagers might expect where the campaign consists of a Demo-
cratic political message which was delivered according to the decisions of the campaign
manager. We find that the messages and strategies of the real-world campaign manager
are highly effective in stimulating voter participation, more effective than might be ex-
trapolated from previous academic studies using non-partisan messages.
The existing voter mobilization literature has not yet resolved whether or not the con-
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tent of the mobilization message has the potential to impact on turnout. Nickerson (2006)
finds that when the message consists of a comparison of candidates as opposed to a com-
parison of parties, there is an increase in turnout. Similarly Bennion (2005) finds that
for voters under the age of 30, appeals to civic duty increase turnout more than state-
ments about a close election, but that for older voters there is no difference. Niven’s
(2006) field experiment found that negative campaign messages increased turnout, con-
trary to the earlier laboratory and observational studies of Ansolabehere et al. (1994) and
Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995), who found that negative messages depressed voter
turnout.
Much of the literature has found that content doesn’t matter. In Green and Gerber’s
seminal book Get Out the Vote (2000), they find no variation in turnout according to a vari-
ety of messages delivered (where they vary the message to include statements about civic
duty, neighborhood solidary, and whether it is a close election). These experiments are
also multi-method, in that they explore direct mail, face-to-face canvassing, and phone
calls. Nickerson (2006) compares professional versus volunteer phone banks and again
finds no variation in turnout by message (where the message includes statements about
civil rights, terrorism, or generational solidarity). Arceneaux and Nickerson (2006) com-
pare positive and negative messages with phone and face-to-face canvassing and again
find no variation in turnout. Trivedi (2005) finds no variation in turnout with a direct mail
experiment which makes different content appeals to ethnic identity. Finally, Green and
Karlan (2006) find no variation in turnout with a robotic phone call experiment where
they compare a simple get-out-the-vote message with an election protection message.
Most of the messages included in the studies above are nonpartisan messages. Our
field experiment is different in that the content of the message is not restricted in any
form; this message is partisan and canvassers are encouraged to deviate from the script
to expand upon the partisan message. Individuals may be more likely to vote based
upon a partisan appeal — this may spark their interest in a particular contest or make
a contest or issue particularly salient. Individuals may be less likely to act based upon
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something abstract (a desire to participate in civic life) andmore likely to act based upon a
political fact which has a direct impact on that individual’s life (that the candidate wishes
to change a health care policy, for example). Thus, this experiment will monitor the effect
of a real campaign. Very little work has been conducted on partisan campaign tactics —
even less has analyzed the effect of a real campaign.
Additionally, this experiment will allow the campaign to chose how to contact each
individual who is assigned to receive the mobilization message. While much of the get-
out-the-vote literature has found that many of the strategies employed by real world cam-
paigns appear to be inefficient or ineffective, much of that analysis has been conducted
in a non-partisan setting where the researcher has determined which individuals are eli-
gible to receive a particular campaign treatment. This may or may not correlate with the
patterns that a campaign would actually employ in choosing which tactics to use with
particular individuals.
In our study the campaign decides which strategies to employ with the individuals
who were randomly assigned to receive a campaign treatment. Only one prior study
has conducted a similar investigation: Nickerson, Friedrichs and King (2006) examine
the effects of a variety of campaign tactics (doorhangers, door-to-door canvassing, and
volunteer phone calls) on turnout in the 2002 Michigan gubernatorial election. Like this
study, their research examines the effect of partisan campaigning in an off-year election.
However, the process by which the campaign may choose to employ a particular cam-
paign tactic is quite different. In their case, a campaign manager will choose which of the
strategies to employ within a congressional district. Then, within that district, treatment
and control groups are assigned for each strategy. But in our study the campaign man-
ager makes the campaign strategy decision on a household-by-household basis. While
this makes it difficult in the context of this present analysis for us to study the causality of
the marginal effects of each distinct campaign tactic (because there is no randomization),
it does allow us to estimate the total effect of allowing the campaign manager to make
each decision (beyond the initial randomization). As a consequence, we are able to gen-
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eralize our results to what would happen in a partisan off-year election campaign where
the campaign manager was permitted to make all campaign decisions. Thus, our paper
estimates the effect of an entire campaign on voter turnout.
This study tests several hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that the partisan, manager-
chosen campaign contacts will have greater effects than previously estimated in other
studies. We evaluate the overall effect of campaign contact using our randomized field
experiment where contact is partisan and the method of contact chosen by the campaign
manager and staff. We then compare our results to those from previous field experiments
involving nonpartisan contact. Second, we anticipate that, consistent with the habitual
voting literature (e.g., Pultzer 2002; Bendor, Diermeier and Ting 2003; Gerber, Green and
Shachar 2003; Fowler 2006), voters with higher propensities to vote will be more likely to
vote in this election. As our data contains information about the prior voting history of all
participants in our field experiment, we can evaluate to what extent there is heterogeneity
in the treatment effect due to prior propensity to vote. Finally, we are able to compare
the effects of this campaign to other campaigns where particular tactics were tested; we
hypothesize that the campaign manager, within the context of a campaign, will be able to
make good decisions about how to allocate resources to different types of contact. Thus
we evaluate the extent to which these different tactics are efficacious. Note that only the
test of our first hypothesis will have the benefit of randomization; the second and third
hypotheses will require tests on observational data.
2 Experimental Approach
Prior to the November 2006 General Election, the Pasadena Area United Democratic
Headquarters (UDH) decided to conduct a randomized experiment in order to evalu-
ate the efficacy of their campaign tactics. Their hope was to increase the Democratic vote
as much as possible by focusing their campaign on Democrats who have some history of
voting or interest in politics, but who may not vote without a reminder or request from
the campaign. To this end they worked tomobilize occasionally-voting Democrats to turn
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out to vote. “Occasionally voting” was defined as voting in 2, 3 or 4 of the last 6 statewide
elections or as having recently registered to vote. Individuals who had voted in the June
2006 primary election were not targeted, under the logic that they were already politi-
cally engaged in this election cycle and did not require an additional stimulus to turnout
to vote.
The Pasadena Area United Democratic Headquarters targets its efforts on California’s
44th Assembly District, which includes Pasadena, the neighboring cities of La Canada
Flintridge, South Pasadena, Arcadia, Temple City and Duarte; the district also includes
a small section of the City of Los Angles and some unincorporated areas of Los Angeles
County.1 In 2006, the local State Assembly seat was open, as the previous incumbent
Assemblywoman had served her limit of three terms. The district is generally considered
to be a “safe” Democratic district, and the Assembly race was not close (the Democratic
candidate, Anthony Portantino, won with 58% of the vote). As a known Democratic
area, however, local Democratic activists felt that the 44th District could play a significant
role in statewide elections, where a large Democratic vote could aid in the effort to elect
State Treasurer Phil Angelides to the Governorship, as well as the rest of the Democratic
ticket.2 Based on experience from previous campaign cycles, the campaign chose a target
universe of roughly 17,000 households as an achievable goal for voter contacts. These
households contained about 20,500 voters who met the campaign’s voter history criteria,
and a total of over 41,000 voters. In addition, roughly 7,500 households were set aside in
the control group, containing roughly 9500 voters who met the voter history criteria, and
a total of nearly 16,000 voters.
The UDH staff worked full work weeks, with a day off each week, and the office was
open from about 10 AM to 10 PM each for the last nine weeks of the campaign. Weeknight
1Amap of the district can be viewed at http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/global/maps/map44.jpg.
2The 2006 general election included the full slate of California state constitutional offices on the ballot
(Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Controller, Treasurer, Attorney General and Insurance
Commissioner). Also on the statewide ballot was U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, running for reelection
against Richard ”Dick”Montjoy. Finally, the statewide ballot included thirteen state ballot measures. Voters
in the 44th District also had on the ballot a U.S. House race, in some places a state senate race, and a variety
of local races and local ballot measures.
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phone banks (Sun-Thurs) ran from approximately 6 PM to 8:45 PM (about 2 hours of
active calling), and weekend afternoons primarily consisted of both walking and calling.
A common weeknight phonebank might have had between four and eight callers.
Several other Democratic campaigns operated in the same geographic area as the
Pasadena Area United Democratic Headquarters, and targeted some of the same vot-
ers with their messages. None of these campaigns, however, targeted this experiment’s
treatment and control groups differently. First, Portantino for Assembly sent mailers
widely throughout the district. That campaign also organized separate precinct walk-
ing operations in the town of La Canada Flintridge, the candidate’s hometown. Second,
Congressman Adam Schiff ran successfully for re-election against both Republican and
Green Party candidates. Schiff sent a small amount of election mail. Third, the California
Democratic Party (CDP) selected a number of precincts within the 44th Assembly District
to target with a direct mail campaign. The Pasadena Area UDH also made phone calls
and walked door-to-door to CDP-targeted voters who were outside the treatment and
control groups of this experiment. That is, the CDP targeted a different universe of po-
tential voters, and the Pasadena Area UDH attempted to get out the vote from the union
of its target universe (on which this experiment was run) and the CDP universe. The
CDP sent direct mail to its target voters regardless of their presence in this experiment’s
treatment or control groups.
Individual voters were aggregated to the household level, and then households were
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. Householdswithin the control group
would not be assigned to receive any contact during the course of the campaign. House-
holds in the treatment group could be contacted in whichever way the campaignmanager
determined was most likely to increase turnout. This meant that the campaign was con-
tinually revising their strategies based upon their resources — the number of volunteers
available, whether the weather or neighborhoods were conducive for face-to-face can-
vassing, the number of phone-lines available to make phone calls, and other factors. This
resulted in a variety of campaign treatments over the course of a nine-week campaign.
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The campaign treatments consisted of a variety of methods, all of which contained
a partisan get-out-the-vote message. For individuals assigned to receive treatment, the
treatments were administered in the followingway: if an individual’s record had an email
address, then that individual was assigned to receive an email during the final GOTV
push.3 Similarly, if an individual had a phone number, then that individual was assigned
to receive a phone call. Note that not all individuals assigned to receive emails or phone
calls did so. Some phone numbers and email addresses were incorrect, and additionally
some individuals were not able to be reached by phone. When recording contacts, an
email contact was recorded if it was attempted, regardless of whether the message was
delivered successfully.
The phone call procedure was split into two phases – the initial campaign phase,
which took place for the first eight weeks of the campaign, and the “get-out-the-vote”
phase, which was conducted during the final week of the campaign. In the first phase,
the procedure with phone calls was to attempt to call each available phone number until
the point at which it was either possible to speak to an individual directly or to leave a
message on their answering machine. The outcome (message or speaking to a person)
was recorded at the point at which the contact was successful. Individuals who directly
responded that they would be positively supporting the Democratic Party in the Novem-
ber 2006 election were first in line to receive a second phone call during the final get-out-
the-vote campaign week. Individuals who had received messages or were not reached in
the initial phase were called after all the positive-responders had been attempted.4 Phon-
ing was done first to Permanent Absentee voters, and then to the rest of the list, without
regard to voting history, gender, ethnicity, etc. There was a small program to have young
volunteers call younger voters, but it wasn’t large or clearly delineated from the rest of
the calling.
The decision to walk a precinct was based on the number of individuals assigned to
our treatment group that lived in that precinct. The campaign determined that walking in
3The script for each email is included in the Appendix.
4The script for the phone calls is included in the Appendix.
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precincts with high numbers of individuals assigned to treatment would be most efficient
in terms of spending resources. Additionally, walking was done only in precincts which
were also targeted by the CDP – this possibly pushed them over the limit into being
worth walking. No precinct was walked which was not targeted by the CDP. Most of
the walkers had canvassed in previous elections, and thus were allowed to go off-script
in administering the Democratic message. The new canvassers received simple training
and were asked to follow a basic script outline until they were comfortable going off of
it. Walkers were usually also phonebankers who knew that script and understood that
the point of their contact with the voter was to identify and motivate Democratic voters
to turn out to vote.
Some precincts were walked with doorhangers, using an assignment mechanism sim-
ilar to that used for precinct-walking. Doorhangers went to precincts targeted by the
CDP, and covered them completely. This is a non-random sample of the treatment group.
Precincts with higher numbers of households in the treatment group were assigned to
receive a doorhanger treatment. Due to the larger number of volunteers for GOTV week-
end, as well as the relative speed of doorhangers compared with precinct walking, more
precincts were walked with doorhangers than had been walked earlier in the campaign.
We then classified individuals as “treated” if they or any member of their household
received any sort of treatment: an email, a phone call, an at-home visit, or a doorhanger.
Each treatment consisted of a Democratic message. Note that regardless of whether
a household contained a single voter assigned to the treatment group, or several vot-
ers assigned to the treatment group, the household would receive a single phone call,
doorhanger, or at-home visit. This was implemented by the campaign such that the can-
vasser would ask to speak to any of the individuals within the household who had the
appropriate voter history.
Finally, we also note one important aspect of our field experiment: all of the phone
calls and door-to-door contacts were administered by volunteers. Nickerson, Friedrichs
and King (2006) suggest the possibility that volunteer phone calls may be more effective
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and findings from Garcı´a-Bedolla, Michelson, andMcConnell (2007) support this finding.
We return to this point after presenting our results.
3 Data
We obtained a pre-election dataset of registered voters from Political Data, Inc., a com-
pany which augments the registered voter file from Los Angeles County with a phone
number and email address for each individual in the dataset when available.5 This dataset
includes the gender, partisan registration, ethnicity and age of each registered voter. Ad-
ditionally, this file documents the previous elections in which each individual has turned
out to vote.
We used this dataset to conduct the randomization for our field experiment in Septem-
ber 2006, where each household was assigned to either the treatment or control group.
The campaign successfully documented whether or not each individual was contacted,
and additionally, recorded the type of stimulus and date of contact. After the election had
taken place, Political Data, Inc. then provided us with an updated file which recorded
whether or not each individual in our dataset had participated in the 2006 general elec-
tion. Thus for each registered voter within each household, we know from the post-
election voter history file whether or not they participated in the 2006 general election.
Based upon the randomization, we are then able to determine the effect of campaign
contact on voter turnout, and we are able to condition this statement on the treatment
variable to get an accurate assessment of the size of this effect. Additionally, we are able
to observe differing turnout rates by time of contact as well as by type of contact. The
randomization, however, occurred prior to the beginning of the experiment. Thus we are
not able to necessarily infer that the timing or type of contact is the causal mechanism
5Political Data, Inc. (PDI) is currently the largest provider of voter information files in California, pri-
marily providing voter information data to political consultants, campaigns and polling firms. PDI obtains
voter information directly from election officials, and integrates other information not commonly found
on the public voter history file. PDI updates their voter information database frequently, as often as once
per month during an election. See http://www.politicaldata.com for additional information on PDI. Our
pre-election dataset used for our randomization was obtained in August 2006.
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for the turnout. We do however present our observational results on timing and type of
contact to gain some insight into which strategies are most likely to be efficacious.
Table 1 documents the dynamics of household contacts. Each cell in the treatment
group or control group category represents the number of individuals the campaign was
able to successfully contact in that week (the row). Note that the campaign can select
which individuals to contact in which weeks, so that while this classification has the po-
tential to provide insight into the mechanism by which this campaign increased turnout,
it is not possible to infer anything directly about the timing of the contact and the result-
ing vote from the analysis reported here. For example, the campaign called voters who
are registered as Permanent Absentee Voters earlier in the cycle than voters who are not,
on the assumption that these voters often vote before election day.
Table 1 Goes Here
Based on the information presented in Table 1 we see that the number of contacts
steadily increased during the course the campaign. In the first two weeks of the exper-
iment, the campaign contacted just over four hundred households. But by the eighth
week, they contacted over thirty-five hundred households; and in the GOTV week, they
contacted over fifteen thousand households. The campaign was able to make more con-
tacts closer to the election in part because volunteers are easier to find as election day
nears. Individuals were often contacted more than once during the campaign; thus in
Table 1, it is likely, for example, for an individual to be contacted both in the first week
and the GOTV week, but not every single voter who was contacted in the early weeks
was contacted again during GOTV week. The timing of contacts is a component of the
strategy for the campaign that we do not explore in depth here but anticipate exploring
in future work.
Based on the data collected by the campaign, we also know the type of contact: by
phone, by face-to-face canvassing (here called “walk”), by email or by a door hanger. Ta-
ble 2 presents the type of contacts the campaign was able to make successfully breaking
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this down further into the contacts made in the treatment and control group. Contacts
made within the control group are inadvertent, but we document these contacts regard-
less so as to account for them when measuring the effect of the campaign. The majority
of the campaign contacts in the treatment group were made by doorhanger and by phone
(over 7000 contacts for each of these types), while only 1426 individuals were contacted
by email and a mere 823 were contacted by face-to-face canvassing. The split for the inad-
vertent control group contacts is similar but much smaller — a total of 1296 individuals
were contacted from the control group while 15217 individuals were contacted by from
the treatment group. Note that some individuals were contacted multiple times, so that
the row sum for the type of contact is not equivalent to the “any contact” cell entry. This
“any contact” category will be useful to determine the effect of the campaign.
Table 2 Goes Here
4 Methods and Results
To test our key hypothesis, we need to estimate the effect of the campaign contacts on
turnout. We consider the individual to have been treated if that person received any
campaign contact whatsoever and determine the effect of that contact on the likelihood
that the person would turn out to vote. We begin by estimating the intent-to-treat effect
(ITT ) and the treatment-on-treated effect (TOT ). The intent-to-treat effect is defined as
the observed difference in turnout between those assigned to the treatment and control
groups. If the contact rate is 100%, the intent-to-treat effect is identical to the treatment
effect. Generally this is not the case, however, and to calculate the treatment effect we
must adjust for the contact rate. The actual treatment (TOT ) effect is defined as the intent-
to-treat effect divided by the contact rate.6 Again we define treatment as any campaign
contact.
Formally, let Z be an indicator which defines whether or not the individual is assigned
to the treatment or control. Let x denote whether the individual actually receives the
6For additional discussion of these quantities, see Rosenbaum (2002) or Morgan and Winship (2007).
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treatment. Let y indicate whether or not the individual voted. Then the intent-to-treat
effect is defined as: ITT = E(y|Z = 1) − E(y|Z = 0). Following from this, then TOT =
ITT
E(x|Z=1)−E(x|Z=0) . Note again that the difference between the intent-to-treat and the total-
treatment-effect is that the TOT accounts for the contact rate. We can estimate TOT by
regressing y on x and using Z as an instrument (e.g., Gerber and Green 2001).
We present the results for ITT and TOT in Table 3. The contact rate for the campaign
here is 28%, which is consistent with previous studies in the literature, in particular given
the campaign’s emphasis on phone contacts. We cluster the standard errors by house-
hold to account for potential spillover effects (one individual speaking to another within
the same household).7 We estimate an ITT of 1.59 percentage points — the difference in
turnout between the percent voting in the treatment group and the percent voting in the
control group – which is statistically significant at traditional levels. Once we condition
on the contact rate, we find an estimated TOT of 5.6 percentage points, which is again
significant at traditional levels. Relative to previous studies, this is a large effect. Re-
call again that this effect is due to campaign contact that consisted mostly of phone calls
made by volunteers. In the existing literature, the highest estimate of phone contact by
volunteers is 5.0 percentage points with the inclusion of covariates (Green 2004), with the
average size of an effect of 2.4 percentage points. This suggests that partisan campaign
contacts, especially those spread out over the a ten week campaign and chosen by a cam-
paign manager, may produce greater turnout effects than might be suggested by prior
studies of nonpartisan campaign contact efforts.
Table 3 Goes Here
We calculate the TOT using a two-stage-least-squares estimate (2SLS), where we want
to estimate the effect of a canvass contact on whether or not an individual votes in the
election where the application of the contact treatment may be endogenous. In order to
7As we anticipate that there will be correlation in the voting decisions within a household, we want to
account for this correlation in estimating robust-cluster standard errors. Thus, we can consider the variance
of our estimator to be: V ar(βˆ) = (X ′X)−1
∑nc
j=1 u
′
juj(X
′X)−1 where uj =
∑
jcluster
eixi.
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implement this analysis we construct an instrumental variable for the contact using the
randomization assignment — this process assures us that the assignment is statistically
independent of the observables and unobservables. Our instrument here is fairly good:
the correlation between the treatment assignment and any contact is .28. Note that we are
assured that there is no correlation between the implementation of the campaign and the
error terms, as the assignment was completed randomly prior to conducting the experi-
ment.
We compare the 2SLS estimate of the contact effect with the 2SLS estimate of the con-
tact effect with all available control variables as well. These include partisan registration
(included here as an indicator for whether or not the individual was a registered Demo-
crat), gender, age, ethnicity (included here as an indicator for whether or not the indi-
vidual was non-Anglo; this field was enhanced by Political Data, Inc. using a database
of ethnic last names and other census data) and the variable we calculated as the indi-
vidual’s propensity to vote. This allows us to extract the impact of some of the variables
which we know tend to influence voter turnout from other models and to focus on the
contact effect alone. We present these results in Table 4. We again calculate robust-cluster
standard errors by household to account for potential spillover effects (one individual
speaking to another within the same household). Additionally, so that we can directly
compare the two models, we create indicator variables for the instances where there a
missing covariate. This also allows us to observe the effect of the the indicators for the
missing data; in our analysis we find that many of the missing indicators are statistically
significant, which suggests that their absence from the voter file may be correlated with
the voter’s turnout decision.
Table 4 Goes Here
Here we still find a large effect of contact when we include the covariates — 6.56
percentage points — which is statistically significant at traditional levels, and a statisti-
cally significant effect of contact without the covariates as well (5.6 percentage points).
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This implies that the covariates are themselves not driving the results and that the cam-
paign is effective at increasing turnout. Note that here we have included an individual’s
propensity to vote as one of the covariates. We find a positive and statistically significant
effect; individuals who are likely voters are again likely to turnout to vote. We observe
a positive and statistically significant effect of being a registered Democrat (although the
effect size is very small), a positive and statistically significant effect of age (which again
is consistent with our expectations that older voters are more likely to go to the polls),
and a negative and statistically significant effect for non-Anglo ethnicity, which is also
consistent with our expectations.
Table 5 describes the mobilization effects of volunteer phone banks as estimated in
previous studies. Our effect, 6.56 percentage points with covariates, is slightly larger
than the magnitude of campaigns with volunteer phone banks, which is 5.0 percentage
points with covariates (Green 2004). One possibility is that the volunteers here are of par-
ticularly high quality, and their ability to go off script and engage voters in conversation is
particularly efficacious. This would correspond with findings in Nickerson (2007), where
the quality of the phone call is key in determining turnout. But note that our study does
not consist entirely of phone calls.
Table 5 Goes Here
At the very least, this is a campaign which has generated large turnout effects relative
to those estimated in the earlier GOTV literature. Therefore, although our randomization
is not conducted with respect to type of contact, vote history, or timing, we investigate
each of these campaign strategies to determine to what extent the effect of the campaign
may be attributed to each. Although we are unable to draw causal claims in all of these
instances due to the lack of randomization, we are able to document which characteristics
are most highly correlated with the increased turnout. We first determine to what extent
the treatment effect may be ascribed to the type of contact and then go on to examine
each of the different campaign strategies in turn. The mechanisms— type of contact, tim-
ing, and who is contacted — may influence the campaign’s success but are not randomly
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assigned and thus cannot provide causal inferences, however, the correlations between
turnout and the time of contact or turnout and the type of contact can be useful in ascer-
taining insight into the campaign’s success.
We first present Table 6 which describes the method(s) by which each individual was
contacted by the campaign. Some individuals were contacted with multiple methods; a
very small number were contacted with three or four different approaches. Again, it is
not possible to draw inferences from any analysis presented here on the turnout resulting
from these methods because they were not randomly assigned. However, it is possible
to observe which methods are most correlated with an increase turnout and potentially
ascribe the campaign’s success to either the choice of those methods for those voters or
for the efficacy of the method itself.
Table 6 Goes Here
The majority of the contacts are made by a single type of campaign strategy — by
either a doorhanger, a phone call, an email or a door-to-door canvasser. The remaining
contacts mostly consist of a combination of two methods (predominantly phone call and
doorhanger). We classify the treatment into five categories — one for each of the individ-
ual contact methods (doorhangers, emails, phone calls or door-to-door canvassing) and
one if an individual was contacted by any mix of the prior four.
We present a summary of turnout rates by treatment type in Table 7, where we look at
the differences in the rates at which individuals turned out to vote by the type of treatment
conditional upon having received a campaign contact. Doorhanger contacts were made
the most frequently but had the lowest observed turnout (51.00%), while phone calls were
made almost as frequently had had the highest turnout (66.66%). This is surprising in
contract to the rest of the literature which tends to ascribe the highest turnout rates to
door-to-door canvassing (here an observed 63.62% turnout). Email contact and multiple
types of contact had similar rates of turnout has well (approximately 59%), which are
both interesting results: email contact is associated with a higher level of turnout than
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expected, but this may simply be due to characteristics of the population which was able
to receive an email and thus merits future analysis. That multiple contacts produced a
similar effect on turnout indicates that two types of campaign contact may not have a
simple additive effect on participation rates.
Table 7 Goes Here
We next examine the effect of phone calls in greater depth as we can take advantage
of the fact that we know the mechanism by which individuals in the experiment were
assigned to receive a phone call from the campaign. If it is the case that an individual
had a phone number in the dataset, they were assigned to receive a phone call. Therefore,
we are again able to rely upon a 2SLS estimate of the effect of contact where we create
a new instrument using both an indicator for whether or not an individual had a phone
number in the dataset and the random assignment variable. We can then examine the
effect of a phone call on turnout. Here we find that there was a 8.1% treatment-on-treated
effect from phone calls, with a standard error of .01.8 The campaign manager’s choices
appear to have been very good — phone call contact was highly effective at getting out
the vote and these contacts produced turnout rates greater than suggested in previous
research on the effect of volunteer phone calls on voter mobilization. As we explore this
finding further an interesting note is that within the group of individuals contacted by
phone calls, we do observe higher percentages of individuals voting who actually spoke
to a volunteer as opposed to those whowere simply contacted by leaving amessage on an
answering machine. Table 8 presents these results. This again suggests that phone calls
completed by motivated volunteers are likely to be very effective. When we compare
our finding to the existing literature, this also suggests that by allowing the campaign
manager to choose whom to call, the effect of volunteer phone calls increases.9
8This calculation incorporates all the 43562 observations who have a phone number and relies upon
conditional random assignment. We have 6,246 individuals who received a phone call in this group and
of those, 4164 voted. Including all the control variables into this regression results in a 7.0% treatment-on-
treated effect, with a standard error of .01.
9Note also that turnout was higher among the population with a working phone line and an answering
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Table 8 Goes Here
We will now examine the extent to which vote history or timing determines to what
extent the campaign is effective. We first present results where we separate individuals
who were contacted during the campaign by category — new registrants, unlikely vot-
ers, low propensity voters, and high propensity voters. We calculate a voters’ propensity
to vote by looking at the number of statewide California elections in which they partici-
pated out of the number for which they were eligible based upon their registration date
over the last six elections.10 Note that this campaign was particularly interested in the
population of occasional voters and hence chosen a selection of individuals (from which
the randomization occurred) who had some history of participating in politics but were
not the individuals who were likely to always participate. Recall that the universe of
voters studied consists of voters selected to meet certain voting history criteria, plus vot-
ers who share a household with such a voter. This strategy was designed to maximize
Democratic turnout; within a population of individuals who are already likely to vote,
the campaign’s efforts would not likely result in large numbers of additional votes. A
byproduct of this strategy is that it is easier to measure the effect of additional stimulus
to get out to the polls.
Here we have a total population of 57,682 individuals. We define a new registrant
as someone who has not been eligible to participate in any elections before, an unlikely
voter as an individual who has not voted in any of the elections for which they were
eligible, a low propensity individual as someone who has voted in at least one, but less
than 50% of the elections for which they were eligible (since November 2002), and a high
propensity individual as someone who has participated in 50% or more of the elections
for which they were eligible (since November 2002). Note that we classify an individual
as newly registered if they had registered after November 2005 but had yet to vote (for
machine or live contact than it was among the voting population as a whole, an indication of the kind of
selection bias we cannot control for in this experiment.
10These included the November 2002 General Election, October 2003 Special Election, June 2004 Primary
Election, November 2004 General Election, November 2005 Special Election and the June 2006 Primary
Election.
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example, in the June 2006 election). Note that Political Data, Inc. obtained their dataset
from the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder’s office in August 2006. This implies
that this classification of newly registered voters may be somewhat different than the
population of individuals who might register in the days and weeks immediately before
an election, and thus these results may not apply to those voters if they are different than
the population of newly registered voters in this study.
Table 9 Goes Here
Looking at the efficacy of the campaign for the new registrants in Table 9, we find a
positive and statistically significant (at traditional levels) large effect of campaign contact.
Our estimated ITT is 6.26 percentage points and our estimated TOT is 24.24 percentage
points. This is an sizeable effect, and contrasts starkly against the treatment effects for the
other groups. The unlikely voters have no statistically significant effect of contact, while
the low propensity voters have a large and statistically significant effect (14.63 percentage
points for TOT) and the high propensity voters have a statistically significant, but smaller
effect (3.34 percentage points for TOT). However, it is important to draw cautious infer-
ences about these differences in treatment effects across voter propensity. The type of
treatment each individual received was not randomly assigned, and thus merits further
investigation.
We also examine when the campaign chose to contact each of these individuals. Here
we produce a classification forwhether an individual was contacted early in the campaign
(in weeks 1-5), in the middle of the campaign (in weeks 6-8), or during the final get-
out-the-vote drive (week 9). Thus we have 3353 individuals who were contacted in the
early campaign, 5784 individuals who were contacted in the middle campaign, and 16593
individuals who were contacted during the final GOTV week. Note that individuals can
be contacted multiple times over the course the campaign so that these classifications are
not exclusive. We then look at the marginal effect of each of these classifications on the
turnout decision, conditional upon being contacted. We use early contact and phone call
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contact as our two base comparison categories. We anticipate that later contact will be
more effective (and thus we will observe positive and statistically significant coefficients
for middle and GOTV contact).
Table 10 Goes Here
In Table 10 we present the ordinary-least-squares coefficients for the variables de-
scribed above.11 The timing variables (middle and GOTV) have coefficients which are
consistent with our expectations — it appears that the marginal effect of contacting a
voter later in the campaign is positive.12 Like the type of treatment discussed above, the
timing of treatment in our field experiment was not randomly assigned, and thus produc-
ing a better estimate for how the timing of treatment influences voter mobilization should
be the subject of future research.
Thus we find the campaign has a large effect on turnout relying upon a range of
techniques and delivering a partisan message. The campaign manager’s strategies and
choices appear to do better than a typical nonpartisan door-to-door canvassing exper-
iment. We found that phone calls are particularly effective at increasing turnout. We
present observational evidence with respect to the timing of the delivery of the campaign
contact (closer to the election appears better) and with respect to the type of voter who
should be targeted (new registrants have the largest effect).
5 Conclusion
The Pasadena Area United Democratic Headquarters runs a campaign generally similar
to the one described in this paper every two years, typically targeting “occasional voting
Democrats”. One of their motivations in undertaking this experiment was to evaluate
the efficacy of the campaign’s chosen strategy and methods. In particular, they wanted
11We also analyze this model in a binary choice setting and a logistic framework but present the OLS
coefficients here for ease of interpretation. There is no qualitative difference between the binary choice and
OLS results.
12We replicate this model including all the covariates for each voter but find that the results do not change
substantively. This results are available from the authors upon request.
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to know whether their selection criteria for targeting voters was effective, and whether
particular kinds of voters were more or less affected by the campaign’s efforts.
We have shown that the Pasadena Area UDH increased turnout in the 2006 general
election by roughly 852 votes.13 The campaign was effective in increasing turnout among
newly registered voters. (Recall that these were not voters registered by the campaign,
but rather voters who had newly registered before the campaign began.) These voters,
while a small population (less than 4% of the treatment group), accounted for about 12%
of the campaign’s total increase in voter turnout. The campaign reaped its greatest re-
wards among low propensity voters who had voted at least once, a population made up
largely of voters who had voted 2 or 3 times in the preceding 6 elections. This population
accounted for over 60% of the campaign’s net effect, while making up 31% of the treat-
ment group. While the campaign’s effect on higher-propensity voters was small when
expressed as a percentage point increase, the size of this universe meant that it accounted
for a larger number of additional votes than the newly registered voter group.
We have also shown that campaign contact in the last few weeks before the election,
and contact with a volunteer by telephone (relative to other means of contact), are as-
sociated with increases in voter turnout. Given the relative ease of finding volunteers
for the finals weeks of a campaign, and the low cost of volunteer phone calls relative to
others methods of voter contact, this experiment indicates that partisan get-out-the-vote
campaigns can be highly effective without exorbitant costs. Again we are cautious about
extrapolating these results to other settings and elections, but for this local election and
partisan context, the campaign was effective at mobilizing the base.
This campaign had total expenses of about $48,000 in 2006.14 With a treatment effect
of 5.6%, this implies that each of the additional 852 votes that the campaign successfully
turned out cost approximately $57.34 per vote. Note that this cost includes all campaign
overheard, and as such is not directly comparable to many of the ”cost per vote” calcula-
13The campaign effect is 5.6% of the 15217 voters in the treatment group who were contacted.
14Of that, $9,000 was rent, $18,500 was staff/consultants, $3,800 was fundraising, and $5,000 was other
overhead (insurance, utilities, etc). The total phone bill was about $4,100. Additionally all printing costs
were covered by the California Democratic Party.
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tions described in much of the academic literature. Subtracting overhead costs of $36,300
from the campaigns’ total expenses, we calculate a cost per vote of only $13.73. The cam-
paign’s volunteer phone banks with experienced and enthusiastic volunteers were very
cost effective.
The principal finding of this paper is that the campaign manager was able to make
reasonable choices and turn out voters at levels exceeding those seen in many academic
studies. This suggests that there may be an aspect of campaign craft which goes into the
creation and development of mobilization efforts which accounts for their varying levels
of success. This also suggests that academic work may underestimate the actual effect of
real-world voter mobilization efforts. In our study, we also explored the potential effect
of the timing of voter contact, the type of voter contact, and how contact interacts with
voting propensity. We found that volunteer phone contact to low propensity voters im-
mediately before the election appears to have been particularly efficacious. In particular
however, this study may have high rates of turnout because of the freedom allocated to
the campaign manager to make choices about how to allocate resources. Future research
should determine the mechanisms by which this happens, which may provide future in-
sights into the intricacies of voter behavior.
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7 Script
7.1 Email Script
”Dear NAME,
Tomorrow, Tuesday November 7th, is a critical day for our state and our country. Only
rarely do we, as voters, a clear opportunity to change the direction of our government.
The last few years have been years of disappointment, with a continuing quagmire in
Iraq, state and federal deficits as far as the eye can see, and our health care system in
crisis.
It is critical that you vote to support Democrats.
The polls will be open tomorrow from 7 AM to 8 PM. Your polling place is:
DESCRIPTION
ADDRESS
You are receiving this email from the Pasadena Area United Democratic Headquarters
because you supplied your email address when you registered to vote. This is a one-time
email; we will not subscribe you to any lists or give your email address to anyone else.
We’ve included a short Democratic voter guide at the end of this email. Please print it out
and bring it with you to the polls.
If you would like to help us contact other local voters to get out and vote, or would like
more information about our Democratic candidates, please give us a call at (626) 683-8124.
Thank you for your support,
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TimWendler
Chair, Pasadena Area United Democratic Headquarters Steering Committee
2006 CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC VOTER GUIDE:
Governor: Phil Angelides
Lt. Governor: John Garamendi
Secretary of State: Debra Bowen
Controller: John Chiang
Attorney General: Jerry Brown
Treasurer: Bill Lockyer
Insurance Commissioner: Cruz Bustamante
Board of Equalization, District 4: Judy Chu
California State Assembly (44th District): Anthony Portantino
U.S. Senator: Diane Feinstein
U.S. Congress (29th District): Adam Schiff
U.S. Congress (26th District): Cynthia Matthews
U.S. Congress (31st District): Xavier Becerra
U.S. Congress (32nd District): Hilda Solis
———————–
PasadenaAreaUnitedDemocratic Headquarters (FEC ID#C00380568, FPPC ID# 1258461)
http://www.pasadenademocrats.com
(626) 683-8124
P.O. Box 70052
Pasadena, CA 91117-7052
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Not approved by any candidate, candidate’s committee, or ballot measure committee.”
7.2 Phone Script
”Hi, my name is [volunteer name], and I’m a volunteer calling from the Pasadena Demo-
cratic Headquarters. May I please speak with [taregt voter name]?
I’m calling this evening to remind you of the election coming up on Tuesday, November
7th, and to ask if we can count on you to vote for Phil Angelides for Governor, Anthony
Portantino for Assembly, and the rest of the Democratic ticket. Can we count on you?
[mark Y/N/U, etc].
Thank you, and we’ll see you at the polls on Tuesday, November 7th.”
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8 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Unique Individual Contacts by Week
Week Treatment Group Control Group Total
Week 1 335 12 347
Week 2 93 0 93
Week 3 425 0 425
Week 4 1829 11 1840
Week 5 674 50 724
Week 6 1432 99 1531
Week 7 735 64 799
Week 8 3595 166 3761
GOTVWeek 15140 1453 16593
Each cell entry represents the number of individuals the campaign was able to success-
fully contact in that week. Note that some individuals may have been contacted multiple
times within a single week which here is represented as a single unique contact in that
week.
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Table 2: Types of Contact
Contact Treatment Control Total
Phone 7722 440 8162
Walk 823 79 902
Email 1426 183 1609
Doorhanger 7313 700 8013
Any Contact 15217 1296 16513
Each cell entry represents the number of contacts the campaign was able to make success-
fully. Individuals may have been contacted by multiple forms and thus for clarification
the any contact field represents the number of unique contacts made by the campaign and
is not a sum of the values above.
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Table 3: Summary: Campaign Effect on Turnout
N in Treatment Group 41683
N in Control Group 15999
N in Treatment Group who are Actually Treated 15217
N in Control Group who are Inadvertently Treated 1296
N who Voted in Treatment Group 24805
N who Voted in Control Group 9266
Percent Voting in Treatment 59.51%
Percent Voting in Control 57.92%
Percent Contacted in Treatment 36.51%
Percent Contacted in Control 8.10%
Contact Rate 0.28
Estimated Intent-to-Treat Effect 1.59
Standard Error of Intent-to-Treat Effect 0.46
Estimated Treatment Effect 5.61
Standard Error of Estimated Treatment Effect 1.80
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered by household.
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Table 4: 2SLS Coefficients: Campaign Effect on Turnout
Variable Without Covariates With Covariates
Contact .056* .0657*
(.018) (.0165)
Democratic Registration .01**
(.0052)
Missing Registration .52*
(.014)
Female -.003
(.0036)
Missing Gender -.04*
(.014)
Age .002*
(.0001)
Missing Age .11*
(.011)
Propensity to Vote .601*
(.007)
Missing Propensity to Vote .525*
(.008)
Non-Anglo -.018*
(.005)
Missing Race .02*
(.006)
Constant .575* .156*
(.006) (.008)
N 57682 57682
Root MSE .4924 .45352
Clusters 38591 38591
* = α = .05
** = α = .10
The instrument used here is the random assignment. Standard errors are robust and clustered by
household.
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Table 5: GOTV Literature: Mobilization Effect of Volunteer Phone Calls
Authors Effect Size (SE) Population
Green (2004) 5.0 New Jersey young voters
(1.8)
Ramirez (2005) 4.6 Precincts with more than 70% Latino voters
(1.84)
Nickerson (2006a) 4.5 6 US cities
(1.7)
Nickerson, Friedrichs & King (2006) 3.5 Young Michigan voters
(1.7)
Wong (2005) 2.9 Asian Americans in Los Angeles County
(2.1)
Nickerson (2007) .05 18 US counties
(.7)
McNulty (2005) -3.7 UC Berkeley Cal Dems
(2.5)
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Table 7: Vote Rates by Type of Campaign Contact
Type of Contact N Treated N Voted Observed Turnout
Email 1134 680 59.96%
Walk 459 292 63.62%
Phone 6307 4204 66.66%
Doorhanger 6524 3327 51.00%
Mixed 2035 1206 59.26%
Total 16459 9709 58.99%
Note that individuals in this sample were all those assigned to receive a campaign contact.
Table 8: Percentage Turnout by Type of Phone Contact: Volunteer or Message
Phone Contact N Vote Percentage
Message Left on Machine Only 1256 732 58.28%
Spoke to a Volunteer at Some Point 6307 4204 66.66%
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Table 10: OLS Coefficients: Marginal Effect of Campaign Strategy and Timing on Turnout
Variable Coefficient
Middle Contact .031*
(.010)
GOTV Contact .033*
(.013)
N 16513
Root MSE .48688
* = α = .05
The comparison category here is early contact. The dependent variable is an individ-
ual’s turnout decision. The population includes all individuals who were successfully
contacted.
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